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Commercial Transportation
by Madeline E. McNeeley *
Yvonne S. Godfrey**
Elizabeth M. Brooks ***
Joshua H. Dorminy****
and Stephen G. Lowry *****
I. INTRODUCTION
Commercial transportation involves all of the significant forms of
passenger and freight transportation across the United States. This
Article surveys significant judicial, regulatory, and legislative
developments in Georgia commercial-transportation law during the
period from June 1, 2019, through May 31, 2020. 1
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II. TRUCKING AND OTHER COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLES
The Georgia statutes governing commercial motor vehicles underwent
no significant changes during the Survey period, but a divided panel of
the Georgia Court of Appeals issued an opinion that, while only physical
precedent, provides an interesting analysis of Georgia’s direct-action
statutes. Furthermore, the significant practical effects of the novelcoronavirus outbreak on the commercial trucking industry spurred
notable emergency responses by Georgia’s Executive Branch.
A. Direct Actions Against Insurers of Interstate Motor Carriers
In Daily Underwriters of America v. Williams, 2 the Georgia Court of
Appeals issued an important decision concerning a plaintiff’s ability to
sue under Georgia’s direct-action statutes. 3 The direct-action statutes
permit a plaintiff involved in an accident with a motor carrier to sue both
the motor carrier and its insurer in the same cause of action, providing
an exception to the general rule that a plaintiff may not sue a liability
insurer as a defendant in an action against its insured. 4 The question
before the court of appeals in Daily Underwriters was whether Georgia
law permitted the plaintiffs’ direct actions against the motor carrier’s
insurer under O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c), 5 which the defendant insurer
alleged only permits such suits when the insured is functioning as an
“intrastate,” not “interstate,” motor carrier. 6
In Daily Underwriters, the plaintiffs, Veronica and Marleaux
Williams, were injured after a tractor-trailer struck their car. Each
brought a separate action, naming the driver of the tractor-trailer, the
trucking company that owned the tractor-trailer, and Daily Underwriters
of America (Daily Underwriters), the trucking company’s insurer. In the
complaints, the Williamses cited O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112 as authority for
their suits against Daily Underwriters. Daily Underwriters moved for
summary judgement, arguing that O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112 permitted direct
actions against insurers for intrastate motor carriers only, and therefore
precluded suit against it in this case, as its insured was engaged in
interstate transportation at the time. 7 The Williamses cited Georgia’s
other direct-action statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140, 8 in their response as a
basis for their suits against Daily Underwriters, and the trial court

354 Ga. App. 551, 841 S.E.2d 135, petition for cert. filed, (Ga. May 28, 2020).
Id.; O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-112 (2020); 40-2-140 (2020).
4 O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c) (2020).
5 Id.
6 Daily Underwriters, 354 Ga. App. at 552, 841 S.E.2d at 138.
7 Id. at 552, 841 S.E.2d at 137–38.
8 O.C.G.A § 40-2-140 (2020).
2
3
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denied summary judgment. 9 On interlocutory review, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s order. 10
Georgia’s two direct-action statutes are distinct, but often conflated.
The court of appeals began by applying the in pari materia principles of
statutory construction to construe O.C.G.A. §§ 40-1-112(c) 11 and
40-1-126 12 together. 13 Section 40-1-112(c), the court determined,
“expressly allows an injured party to file a direct action against a motor
carrier’s insurance carrier for causes of action arising ‘under this part,’
i.e., Title 40, Chapter 1, Article 3, Part 2.” 14 Section 40-1-126, meanwhile,
states that “[t]he provisions of this part do not apply to purely interstate
commerce nor to carriers exclusively engaged in interstate commerce.” 15
Thus, the “plain language of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-126 evinces the legislative
intent that the direct action provision of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c) does not
apply to purely interstate commerce or to a carrier engaged exclusively
in interstate commerce.” 16
With this established, the court of appeals went on to determine that
the defendant motor carrier was engaged in interstate commerce at the
time of the accident, as it was traveling from Georgia to pick up a load in
North Carolina that was then to be dropped off in Georgia. 17 This, the
court reasoned, evidenced that the trip at the time the accident occurred
was one of interstate commerce, and therefore not permitted by O.C.G.A.
§ 40-1-112(c), the authority cited by the Williamses in their complaints
for the direct action against Daily Underwriters. 18 The court of appeals,
however, did not end its analysis there.
Rather, the court looked to the direct-action statute cited by plaintiffs
in their response to the summary judgment motion, O.C.G.A.
§ 40-2-140(d)(4). 19 Daily Underwriters argued that the court should not
consider this statute as it was cited in a response brief and not the
Williamses’ complaint. 20 The court disagreed with this argument,
stating, “[w]hile it is often good advocacy to cite supporting statutory
authority in a complaint, we are aware of no authority for the proposition
that such citations are required and the appellant has cited no such
Daily Underwriters, 354 Ga. App. at 552, 841 S.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 551–52, 841 S.E.2d at 137.
11 O.C.G.A. § 4-1-112(c) (2020).
12 O.C.G.A. § 40-1-126 (2019).
13 Daily Underwriters, 354 Ga. App. at 553, 841 S.E.2d at 138.
14 Id. at 554, 841 S.E.2d at 138–39.
15 Id. at 554, 841 S.E.2d at 139 (quoting O.C.G.A. §40-1-126).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 555, 841 S.E.2d at 139.
18 Id. at 556, 841 S.E.2d at 140.
19 Id.
20 Id.
9

10
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authority.” 21 The court determined that Daily Underwriters had
adequate notice of the plaintiffs’ claims as alleged in their complaints,
and the court would “not allow an overbroad and unduly rigid conception
of waiver to lead us to create an idiosyncratic precedent that disregards
controlling legal authority.” 22 The court then cited provisions of O.C.G.A.
§ 40-2-140 that explicitly authorize suit against a motor carrier and its
insurer regardless of whether it arose in tort or contract if that motor
carrier engaged in interstate commerce. 23 Thus, the court held, the
Williamses’ claims against Daily Underwriters were permitted by
O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140(d)(4). 24 Notably, Senior Judge Phipps dissented from
the majority’s holding as to the § 40-2-140 issue, explaining he would
have ruled in favor of Daily Underwriters because citing the statute for
the first time in the summary judgment response should not be sufficient
to survive summary judgment. 25
Although this opinion is physical precedent only, it provides important
insight into the judges’ views on two important issues of Georgia law: its
pleading standards and its contrasting direct-action statutes.
B. Effects of the Novel Coronavirus/COVID-19 Pandemic
In the wake of the novel coronavirus that became the source of the
COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, many shoppers in Georgia were
greeted by empty shelves in their local grocery stores. 26 Many Georgians
feared being confined to their homes without vital paper products and
food and began to stockpile essential goods. 27 This put a corresponding
strain on the local and national supply chains.
In response to the strain on the supply chain, in March of 2020, the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) issued a national
emergency declaration to provide hours of service regulatory relief to
commercial vehicle drivers transporting emergency relief in response to
the pandemic. 28 This is the first time in history that the FMCSA has
Id.
Id. at 557, 841 S.E.2d at 141.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 558; 841 S.E.2d at 141.
25 Daily Underwriters, 354 Ga. App. at 559-60, 841 S.E.2d at 142 (Phipps, J., dissenting).
26 Andy Peters, Some Store Shelves Quickly Empty but Experts Say It’s Short Term,
ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, https://www.ajc.com/news/breaking-news/some-storeshelves-quickly-empty-but-experts-say-short-term/2sVSZtLg5fDDPxqFSOfPzO/
(last
visited July 17, 2020).
27 Id.
28 49 C.F.R. § 390.23 (2020) (Emergency Declaration No. 2020-002, March 13, 2020).
Although federal regulatory changes are technically outside the scope of this Article, this
emergency declaration provides important context for the scope of Georgia’s own executive
order and the environment in which it was issued.
21
22
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issued nationwide relief. The declaration provides for regulatory relief for
commercial vehicle operations intending to supply: medical supplies and
equipment related to testing, diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19;
supplies and equipment necessary for healthcare workers; food for
emergency restocking of stores; equipment and supplies necessary to
establish temporary housing and quarantine facilities related to COVID19; and personnel to provide medical or other emergency services. 29
The emergency declaration grants motor carriers and drivers relief
from Parts 390 through 399 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. 30 In effect, the declaration relaxes the rest requirements
found in federal regulations, allowing drivers to be on the road for longer
periods of time. 31 Drivers are still required to comply with the rest
periods following the completion of the delivery of the essential goods or
personnel. 32 The declaration further relaxes the equipment and
standards necessary for operating commercial trucks with longer
containers and multiple containers and extends the period of time for
holders of commercial driver’s licenses to renew their licenses. 33
In Georgia, Governor Brian Kemp issued an executive order on March
14, 2020, that declared a statewide “public health state of emergency.” 34
Among other actions, the Order suspended the federal regulations
limiting hours of service for drivers of commercial vehicles. 35 Going
beyond the federal declaration, Governor Kemp’s Order provides that no
motor carrier will require or allow an ill or fatigued driver to operate a
motor vehicle and requires at least ten consecutive hours off-duty for any
driver who notifies a motor carrier that they are fatigued or ill. 36
Governor Kemp’s Order also relaxed the restrictions on the maximum
weight, height, and length of commercial vehicles operating on Georgia’s
public highways for the purpose of providing disaster relief and
preparation. 37 The executive order extends the maximum weight limit
for trucks transporting essential materials on Georgia’s roads from
80,000 pounds to 95,000 pounds. 38 As of the time of this writing, these
provisions have been extended through August 11, 2020. 39

Id.
Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 49 C.F.R. § 390.23 (2020) (Emergency Declaration No. 2020-002, March 13, 2020).
34 Ga. Exec. No. 03.14.20.01.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Ga. Exec. No. 06.29.20.01.
29
30
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While the relaxation of the federal and state regulations will
eventually expire, the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have lasting effects
on the commercial motor vehicle industry and the regulation of the
industry. It remains to be seen what, if any, impact the relaxation of
these regulations have on wrecks involving commercial motor vehicles
during the pendency of the crisis and what future impacts will be felt in
the litigation of cases arising out of commercial vehicle wrecks and the
future of commercial vehicle regulations.
III. AVIATION
The general framework of aviation law is significantly shaped and
determined by federal regulations 40 and, in some cases, international
treaties. 41 In fact, the stated intention of Georgia’s aviation statutes is
“to coincide with the policies, principles, and practices established by the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and all amendments thereto.” 42 As a result,
federal courts determine much of the caselaw regulating commercial
aviation. 43
With the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic during the past year, no
significant developments in Georgia aviation law occurred as a result of
judicial decisions or proposed or enacted legislation. However, on a more
positive note, while not having the force of statutory or case law, both the
Senate and the House of Representatives of Georgia passed resolutions
recognizing the contributions of the Civil Air Patrol to the citizens of

40 Robin Larner, 15 GA. JUR. § 29:25 (2019) (“Federal aviation regulations have been
promulgated to regulate virtually every aspect of aviation in the United States; these
regulations are duly published in accordance with law in the Code of Federal Regulations,
and they have the force of law.”)
41 A United Nations treaty, the Montreal Convention, sets forth uniform rules for claims
that arise out of incidents that occur during international air transportation. See Marotte
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Warsaw Convention is
the exclusive mechanism of recovery for personal injuries suffered on board an aircraft or
in the course of embarking or disembarking from an airplane.” (citation omitted)); Espinoza
Ugaz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (“The Montreal
Convention entered into force in the United States on November 4, 2003 and superseded
[sic.] the Warsaw Convention.”).
42 O.C.G.A. § 6-2-1 (2020).
43 However, Georgia courts routinely analyze and consider federal aviation regulations
when addressing aviation related issues under state law. See, e.g., Eagles Jets, LLC v.
Atlanta Jet, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 386, 398, 740 S.E.2d 439, 450 (2013) (discussing whether
the Certificate of Aircraft Registration required by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) constitutes ownership of the aircraft for purposes of a contract dispute); Sky King
101, LLC v. Thurmond, 314 Ga. App. 377, 724 S.E.2d 412, 413 (2012) (addressing FAA
flight procedures and regulations followed by pilots when analyzing whether defendant air
transportation company had “control” over a co-pilot sufficient to be considered his
employer).
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Georgia. House Resolution No. 1342, 44 adopted February 28, 2020, and
Senate Resolution No. 863, 45 adopted March 3, 2020, acknowledged the
contribution of the Georgia Wing of the Civil Air Patrol, consisting of
nearly 1,900 volunteer members in forty squadrons and six groups
located throughout the state. 46 Among other things, Georgia Wing
members contributed to disaster relief, emergency services, search and
rescue, aerospace education, and homeland security, at an estimated
value of $5.8 million worth of volunteer hours in 2019 alone. 47 While not
directly pertaining to commercial aviation, the resolutions demonstrate
the significant and valuable impact Georgia volunteers have on aviation
operations in this state.
IV. RAILROADS
A. Regulatory Developments
Regulations governing railroads stem mostly from federal legislation,
rendering state regulation in this arena a rarity as it is often preempted
by applicable federal law. Nevertheless, on May 23, 2019, the Georgia
General Assembly adopted the Railroad Track Maintenance Tax Credit 48
as part of the Georgia Administrative Code. 49 The purpose of the
regulation is to provide income tax incentives to those who own or lease
a Class III railroad, as defined by 49 C.F.R. § 1201, 50 and incur
expenditures for the maintenance and improvement of the track. 51 The
regulation accompanies O.C.G.A. § 48-7-40.34, 52 which initially became
effective on May 8, 2018, in order to “provide[] guidance concerning the
implementation and administration of the income tax credit” under the
statute. 53
Pursuant to the regulation, “a Class III railroad shall be allowed a tax
credit in the amount of fifty percent of the qualified railroad track
maintenance expenditures paid or incurred by such Class III railroad
during the taxable year.” 54 The credit is capped, however, and “shall not
exceed $3,500 multiplied by each mile of railroad track owned or leased
Ga. H.R. Res. 1432, Reg. Sess., 2020 Ga. House J. 1,1.
Ga. S. Res. 863, Reg. Sess., 2020 Ga. Senate J. 1,1.
46 2019 H.R. 1342; 2019 S.R. 863.
47 Id.
48 GA COMP. R. & REGS r. 560-7-8-.64.
49 Id.
50 49 C.F.R. § 1201 (2018).
51 GA COMP. R. & REGS. r. 560-7-8-.64.
52 O.C.G.A. § 48-7-40.34 (2018).
53 GA COMP. R. & REGS. r. 560-7-8-.64(1).
54 Id. at 560-7-8-.64(3).
44
45
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in Georgia as of the close of the taxable year by such Class III railroad.” 55
In order to claim the credit, the regulation initially required an applicant
to submit Form IT-RTM through the Georgia Tax Center, but the
regulation was amended on November 12, 2019, to revise this provision
for a more comprehensive application process. 56 Currently, an applicant
must “submit Form IT-RTM, and any other information that the
Commissioner may request, with the taxpayer's Georgia income tax
return each year the tax credit is claimed.” 57 The credit may also be sold
or transferred to one or more Georgia taxpayers, and both the transferee
and transferor taxpayer may be structured as pass-through entities. 58
The regulation is applicable to taxable years beginning January 1, 2019,
and contains a sunset provision repealing the regulation on January 1,
2024. 59
While this regulation provides an incentive for Georgia taxpayers who
own or lease railroads to maintain their property, it is also a benefit to
Georgians as the regular upkeep and improvements of railroad tracks,
roadbeds, bridges, and related structures contribute to the overall safety
of railroad transportation.
B. Case Law Developments
The Georgia Supreme Court issued an important opinion during this
Survey period regarding the interplay of two federal statutory schemes,
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) 60 and the Federal Railroad
Safety Act (FRSA). 61 In Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Hartry, 62 the
supreme court granted certiorari to address, as a matter of first
impression, whether a railroad employee’s claim under FELA is barred
by regulations contained in the FRSA. The case arose after the plaintiff,
who was operating a train on behalf of his employer, collided with a
tractor-trailer after its driver drove through a railroad crossing while the
warning arms were down. The plaintiff, Winford Hartry, along with his
wife, sued the owner of the tractor-trailer alleging state law negligence
claims, as well as Norfolk Southern Railway Company (Norfolk) under
FELA. The basis of the Hartrys’ FELA claim was that Norfolk failed to
provide Mr. Hartry with a reasonably safe place to work by failing to

Id. at 560-7-8-.64(4).
at 560-7-8-.64(7).
57 Id. at 560-7-8-.64(8).
58 GA COMP. R. & REGS. r. 560-7-8-.64(11).
59 Id.at 560-7-8-.64(14)–(15).
60 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2019).
61 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101–311 (2019).
62 307 Ga. 566, 837 S.E.2d 303 (2019).
55

56Id.
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maintain the crossing gates, which “dangerously malfunctioned.” 63
Norfolk filed a motion for summary judgment on the FELA claim, which
the trial court granted. The trial court agreed with Norfolk’s argument
that the Hartrys’ FELA claims were precluded by regulations under the
FRSA, and that there was no issue of material fact as to whether Norfolk
had notice of a gate-crossing malfunction. The case proceeded to trial on
the state law claims and the jury found in favor of the Hartrys. The
Hartrys then appealed the summary-judgment order, and the Georgia
Court of Appeals determined the trial court had erred in granting
summary judgment to Norfolk. 64
Norfolk argued in the supreme court that its duty was controlled by 49
CFR § 234.107, 65 promulgated by the Federal Railroad Authority (FRA)
under FRSA. It contended that this regulation delineates the actions to
be taken “after a railway receives a ‘credible report’ of a crossing
malfunction, and that because there was no ‘credible report’ as defined
under that regulation, the Hartrys’ FELA claim was precluded.” 66
The supreme court first briefly addressed the issue of whether the
Hartrys’ claims were preempted under the FRSA, concluding that
because “this case concerns two federal acts, the preemption doctrine and
the express preemption provision in FRSA are inapplicable.” 67 The court
next addressed whether the Hartrys’ claims were precluded by the FRSA.
Norfolk asserted that the FELA claim was precluded by the goal of the
FRSA, which is to ensure the “[l]aws, regulations, and orders related to
railroad safety . . . shall be nationally uniform to the extent
practicable.” 68 The supreme court rejected this argument, stating the
FRSA provision relied upon by Norfolk is contained in the section “that
expressly concerns preemption of state laws,” and “does not resolve the
question before us.” 69 The court stated that its previous decision in
Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Zeagler 70 acknowledged that “‘the law
regarding preclusion of FELA claims by FRSA regulations is somewhat
unsettled.’” 71 But in the interim of the supreme court’s decision in Zeagler
and the Hartrys’ case, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 72 in which the Court applied
Id. at 566–67, 837 S.E.2d at 306.
Id. at 567, 837 S.E.2d at 306.
65 49 C.F.R. § 234.107 (2019).
66 Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 307 Ga. at 568, 837 S.E.2d at 306.
67 Id. at 569, 837 S.E. 2d at 307.
68 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(1)).
69 Id.
70 293 Ga. 582, 748 S.E.2d 846 (2013).
71 Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 307 Ga. at 570, 837 S.E.2d at 308 (quoting Zeagler, 293
Ga. at 598, 748 S.E.2d at 846).
72 573 U. S. 102, 112, 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236 (2014).
63
64
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traditional rules of statutory interpretation to determine that the express
terms of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not preclude a suit by
POM Wonderful, a private party, alleging that Coca-Cola misled
consumers with a label on its juice beverage in violation of the Lanham
Act. 73 The question before the Court turned on whether a cause of action
under one federal statute was precluded by the provisions of another
federal statute, which was analogous to the task of the Georgia Supreme
Court in the Hartrys’ case against Norfolk. 74 Relying on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in POM Wonderful, the Georgia Supreme
Court held that no provision in the FRSA explicitly precluded suits
involving FELA claims, and, further, that “FRSA and FELA ‘complement
each other in major respects, for each has its own scope and purpose.’” 75
Thus, the court concluded, the Hartrys’ FELA claims against Norfolk
were not precluded and the Court of Appeals decision overturning the
grant of summary judgment was affirmed. 76
V. TRANSPORTATION FOR HIRE: LIVERY AND RIDESHARE SERVICES
No notable legislative or judicial developments affected taxicabs,
limousine services, or transportation network (rideshare) companies
during the Survey period. In the administrative realm, the Department
of Public Safety promulgated regulations at Subtitle 570-38-5 77
regarding certificate requirements for limousine carriers. 78 The
regulations reinforce that limousine carriers, as defined in O.C.G.A.
§ 40-1-151, 79 must obtain limousine certificates from the Department
and are subject to the requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations, the Department’s Transportation Rulebook, and Title 40,
Chapter 1, Article 3, Part 3 of the Georgia Code. 80 The regulations also
set forth requirements for safety inspections of limousines and provide
that failure to comply with or to pass such inspections may result in
disqualification of the vehicle, revocation of the limousine carrier’s
certificate, and civil or criminal penalties. 81 Limousine carriers may only
use vehicles that are owned or leased (as defined in the regulations) by
the carriers themselves or by persons or entities with ownership interest
Id. at 112–13, 134 S. Ct. at 2236–2237.
Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 307 Ga. at 572, 837 S.E.2d at 309 (quoting POM
Wonderful, 573 U. S. at 115, 134 S. Ct. at 2228).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 573, 837 S.E.2d at 310.
77 GA COMP. R. & REGS. r. 570-38-5-.01 (May 11, 2020).
78 GA COMP. R. & REGS. r. 570-38-5-.01 through 570-38-5-.07
79 O.C.G.A. § 40-1-151 (2019).
80 GA COMP. R. & REGS. r. 570-38-5-.04.
81 Id. at 570-38-5-.05.
73
74
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in the carriers. 82 Finally, the Department clarified the sources of its
authority to revoke, alter, or suspend limousine carriers’ certificates. 83
As for regulations affecting rideshare companies and taxi services, the
Department merely relocated the regulations at chapter 570-35 to
subtitle 570-38-6 without significant changes. 84
VI. AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY
Georgia’s first law relating to autonomous vehicles came in 2017 and
allowed for the testing and operation of autonomous vehicles on public
roads in Georgia. 85 As discussed in detail in earlier editions of this
Survey, Georgia law sets forth certain minimum safety and insurance
standards for these vehicles and ensures that these vehicles adhere to
existing consumer-protection laws. 86
While Georgia’s courts and legislatures were quiet with respect to
autonomous vehicles over the last year, the industry is preparing to make
a move into the state. In January of 2020, The Ray, an 18-mile stretch of
Interstate 85 in southern Georgia, opened. 87 The Georgia Department of
Transportation teamed up with private-sector companies to replace the
pavement markings on this stretch of highway to meet the performance
requirements of autonomous vehicles. 88 This section of highway will be
used as a test bed for autonomous personal and commercial vehicles in
Georgia. 89
While Georgia does have a regulatory framework that considers
personal and commercial autonomous vehicles, Georgia’s legislatures
and courts will need to adapt to new issues that arise as these vehicles
become more commonplace.
VII. SHAREABLE DOCKLESS MOBILITY DEVICE RENTALS
Electric bicycles and scooters appear to be here to stay in Georgia
cities. In 2019, people in Atlanta took about 4,385,000 rides and spent

Id. at 570-38-5-.06.
Id. at 570-38-5-.07.
84 Id. at 570-38-6-.01 through .13; see id. 570-35-.01 through.12.
85 Ga. S. Bill 219, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 214 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of tit. 40)
86 Id.; O.C.G.A. § 40-8-11 (2019).
87 Skip Descant, Georgia Makes Way for Driverless Vehicles, 18 Miles of It, GOVERNING
(last visited July 17, 2020) https://www.governing.com/news/headlines/Georgia-MakesWay-for-Driverless-Vehicles-18-Miles-of-It.html.
88 Id.
89 Id.
82
83
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more than $16 million on shareable electric scooters and bicycles. 90 State
and local legislatures have continued their attempts to update
regulations to deal with this new technology.
While the Official Code of Georgia was updated last year to deal with
safety issues involving electric bicycles, much needed updates related to
electric scooters were conspicuously absent. 91 Recently, the Georgia
Senate passed Senate Bill 159 92 in an attempt to correct this issue.
Senate Bill 159 would update O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1 93 to include a definition
of “electric scooter” as a device weighing less than 100 pounds that is
equipped with handlebars and an electric motor, powered by an electric
motor or human power or both, and capable of speeds of no more than
twenty miles per hour when powered by the electric motor. 94 The Bill
would further update the definition of “motor vehicle” found in O.C.G.A.
§ 40-1-1 to include electric scooters. Senate Bill 159 also would amend
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-371 95 relating to powers of local authorities regarding
highways under their jurisdiction. The Bill proposes to add the regulation
of electric scooters to the powers of local authorities. 96 Although the bill
passed the Georgia Senate and was reported favorably by substitute by
the House Committee on Transportation, it did not pass the full house
before the end of the truncated legislative session. It does, however,
provide insight into measures the legislature might take up in the next
legislative session.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As in so many other areas of American life, the coronavirus pandemic
was the major story in the commercial-transportation world during the
Survey period, not only because of the months-long closure of the courts
and suspension of the legislative session but because of the emergency
response it provoked to supply-chain issues. While the law of commercial
transportation remained relatively stable overall, practitioners should be
prepared for backlogged legislation and judicial opinions to emerge over
the next year.
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